Is the Parliament really Supreme?
There is no doubt that from the point of view of political theory, among the three organs of governance – executive, legislative and judiciary, the legislative is supreme. The executive is in power for as long as it commands the majority on the floor of the house, and the courts can only interpret the laws enacted by them. However in the practice of politics, parliaments have had to work hard to assert their control over the actions of the executive, especially with regard to issues connected with foreign affairs and national security.
As KV Prasad brings out in his masterly treatise Indian Parliament: Shaping Foreign Policy, a publication supported by the ICWA, external affairs has somehow remained the predominant (if not exclusive domain) of the Prime Ministers. Many of the critical decisions on foreign policy taken by Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao Manmohan Singh, and now Prime Minister Modi with support from the PMO, the MEA and now the NSA often invoke the issue of national security, thereby limiting the discussions on the finer nuances. Given the nature of our parliamentary democracy, those in the ruling party are compelled to extend their support to the Prime Minister, and the opposition MPs also weigh their comments wisely, especially when it comes to defence and foreign affairs. Thus during the wars of 1962, 1965, 1971, the Kargil conflict, MPs spoke in one voice. The only exception was that of a section of the CPI which supported China in 1962 on ideological grounds. Again, while in general, there has been a consensus on most issues, including NAM in its heydays, and statehood for Palestine, in general, Congress is perceived to be closer to the Arabs, just as the Jan Sangh and BJP have been more inclined towards Israel.
India and the Commonwealth
Prasad places all these foreign policy debates in the historical context – of how Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress party discussed foreign policy issues – in the Constituent Assembly, and then the Provisional Parliament (as it came to be called after 26th November, 1949). The first major issue was that of India joining the Commonwealth. Although Nehru was in favour, the criticism was stringent. Objections voiced included the issue of calling it the British Commonwealth, accepting the Crown as its head and that ‘joining the Commonwealth would come in the way of India crafting her own policy’. Many members, including Congressmen, said that ‘the Commonwealth was just another name of the Anglo American bloc, and it militated against the policies of racist exclusion (still) practiced in Commonwealth countries like South Africa and Australia’. Finally Nehru had to issue a statement which read: ‘It is open to this House or parliament at any time to break this link, if they chose to, not that I want this link broken. But I am merely pointing out that we have not bound the future down in the slightest … the future is as free as air, and this country can go any way it chooses … Compared to the opposition to the Commonwealth, the House was more accommodative to the UNO. But members were agitated and concerned about the safety and security of diasporic Indians – in SA, Malaysia, Burma, Fiji and Ceylon, Mauritius, besides of course those living in the French enclaves of Pondicherry and the Portuguese enclaves in Goa and DN&H (Dadra and Nagar Haveli).
IPKF (Indian Peace-Keeping Force), WTO (World Trade Organisation) and the India US Nuclear Deal
Prasad then goes on to discuss the three specific dimensions of security, geo economic and good political/strategic from the prism of key decisions that have left a lasting imprint on India’s foreign policy – the IPKF operations in Sri Lanka in the late eighties, the decision to join the WTO, and the India US civil nuclear agreement. In retrospect, it does appear that our decision to intervene in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka without adequate preparation and ground work was a disaster waiting to happen. The Prime Minister’s overdependence on ambitious diplomats like JN Dixit and generals like Sundarji cost the country the lives of over 1500 jawans to militant groups which had received its initial training from our soldiers. The ultimate irony was the condition laid down by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) to resume talks with Sri Lanka: these included expulsion of the IPKF, and non-inclusion of Indians in the talks.
Even more contentious than the IPKF intervention was the decision to join the WTO in 1994, especially in the light of the vehement opposition to the Agreement on Agriculture, the multifibre agreement, and the dissonance between TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) and CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity). The point to note is that because of the points raised by the members from across the political spectrum, India’s negotiators got a sense of how strong the opposition was to the Dunkel Draft. It also became clear that even among the mandarins, the views of the Krishi Bhawan were not exactly in sync with the Udyog Bhawan (which housed the Commerce Ministry). Additionally, the issue of asymmetry of information between the government ministers and the members of the opposition come to the fore. The discussions were often so technical, that it was virtually impossible for MPs from the opposition to offer a nuanced response to the various provisions. That the WTO has not really succeeded in giving the world a rules based system of trade also shows that many of the critical comments made by the parliamentarians were indeed quite relevant.
Last, but not the least, Prasad takes up the issue of the Indo-US civil nuclear co-operation. Unlike the other two, this one is an ongoing functional arrangement, which is proving to be beneficial. Here is an example of the many twists and turns – the unflinching support of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who staked his prestige as well as the survival of his government, the vehement opposition of the Left, who eventually left the government, the concerns with regard to liability of suppliers in the event of a Bhopal or Chernobyl type disaster, as well as the (unexpected, though welcome) support from the BJP. This was an example of positive bipartisan consensus on an issue which is both crucial, as well as critical to India’s energy security.
In fine, Prasad’s book is indeed a valuable contribution to an aspect of Indian polity on which much more academic work needs to be done. This book is a very good first step in this direction.
And in any case, Parliaments can only react to the decisions that have already been made. However, over the years, Parliament has tried to reclaim its role in the foreign policy debates.
The fact of the matter is that is that for multiple reasons : some of which are listed below, Parliamentarians are often unable to exercise the kind of influence
First, unlike the executive and the judiciary which are always functional, Parliaments have to be convened – and more often than not, the Parliaments is not in session. Even when it is in session, the time available to each member to make his/her point is limited, and often based on the discretion of the Speaker or deputy speaker (in Lok Sabha) and the VP or the Deputy Chairman in the Rajya Sabha. The randomization of starred and unstarred questions, and the fact that not more than three to four questions can be taken up in the question hour. Then there is the asymmetry of information and power.
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